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TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - PHYSICIANS ARE LIABLE FOR 
THE EXPENSES OF RAISING A CHILD WHEN THE CHILD'S 
BIRTH IS THE RESULT OF A NEGLIGENTLY PERFORMED 
STERILIZATION PROCEDURE. Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 
473 A.2d 429 (1984). 
One year after a physician had performed a sterilization procedure 
on her, a Maryland woman gave birth to a healthy child. The woman 
and her husband sued the physician for malpractice. A jury determined 
the physician had negligently performed the sterilization procedure! and 
awarded lump sum damages to the woman and her husband; however, 
the jury did not disclose the extent to which the damages included the 
costs of raising the unplanned child through the age of majority.2 The 
physician appealed the award of damages for child rearing expenses. 3 
Prior to the court of special appeals's consideration of the case, the 
Maryland court of appeals granted certiorari.4 The court of appeals 
held that under traditional negligence and damages standards, the par-
ents of an unplanned but healthy child may recover the expenses of rais-
ing that child to majority when the child's birth was the result of a 
negligently performed sterilization procedure. 5 
The majority of jurisdictions that have decided whether the costs of 
raising an unplanned child are recoverable have denied the award of such 
damages, expressing a variety of rationales. 6 In the first reported case7 
1. Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257,262,473 A.2d 429,431 (1984). 
2. [d. The jury also did not disclose the extent to which it considered the benefit to the 
parents of having a healthy child. [d. The trial judge had instructed the jury to 
consider both the costs of raising the unplanned child and the benefits of the birth of 
a healthy child. [d. 
3. [d. 
4. [d. at 259 n.l, 473 A.2d at 430 n.l Goint petition of the parties for the court of 
appeals to consider an issue of first impression). 
5. [d. at 274, 473 A.2d at 438. The term wrongful conception or wrongful pregnancy 
is generally used to refer to the cause of action brought by the parents of an unplan-
ned child against the physician who negligently performed the sterilization proce-
dure or abortion. This term is distinguished from wrongful birth, which is the action 
brought by the parents of a child with birth defects, and from wrongful life, which is 
the action brought by the child born with the defects. University of Ariz. v. Supe-
rior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 581 n.l, 667 P.2d 1294, 1296 n.l (1983). In Jones, the 
above terminology is not used. See Comment, Recovery of Childrearing Expenses in 
Wrongful Birth Cases: A Motivational Analysis, 32 EMORY L.J. 1167, 1176 (1983) 
(remarking on terminology); Recent Decisions, Boone v. Mullendore: Confusion of 
Actions in Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Pregnancy, 35 ALA. L. 
REV. 179 (1984). 
6. Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. at 263-65, 473 A.2d at 432-33; see generally Annot., 
83 A.L.R.3D 15 (1978) (liability for the birth of an infant who allegedly would not 
have been born "but for" the defendant's acts or omissions). 
7. Christensen v. Thomby, 192 Minn. 123, 126, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (1934); Miller & 
Dean, Liability of Physicians for Sterilization Operations, 16 A.B.A. J. 158, 160 
(1930) (no reported cases "in which a person who has consented to a sterilization 
operation has brought suit against the physician"); see also, Robertson, Damages for 
the Birth of a Child - Some Possible Policy Barriers, 23 MED. SCI. LAW 2, 3 (1983) 
(indicating absence of case law on negligently performed sterilization procedures in 
Great Britain). 
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involving the birth of an unplanned child following a negligently per-
formed sterilization procedure, the Supreme Court of Minnesota stated, 
in dictum, that the costs of raising the child could not be recovered be-
cause such costs were too remote from the "avowed purpose" of the ster-
ilization.8 In subsequent cases, some courts have concluded that child 
rearing costs are too speculative in nature to support a damages award.9 
One court indicated that a jury would be unable to assess the benefits and 
losses associated with such a claim. 10 
Other jurisdictions denying damages for prospective child rearing 
costs have found that such an award would place an unreasonable bur-
den upon the physician. I I Those courts have reasoned that the physician 
would become a "surrogate parent," 12 or that the financial burden would 
be borne by the physician while the parents enjoyed the benefits of 
parenthood. \3 The child's emotional and psychological well-being has 
also been a concern. 14 Some courts have expressed a fear that the un-
planned child would become an "emotional bastard,"15 recognizing that 
the child may be adversely affected if he learns another person provided 
the funds for his support, inferring that his parents did not want him.16 
The majority view expresses the opinion that the birth of a healthy 
child is not a cognizable injury.17 One court rejected a claim for full 
recovery of damages, reasoning that no other tort results in the creation 
8. Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 126, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (1934) (expenses 
incident to the birth of the unplanned child are too remote from the vasectomy 
which was designed to render the plaintiff infertile); accord Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 
650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982). 
9. E.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), affd, 349 
A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 181, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301 
(1980); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 
415 U.S. 927 (1974). 
10. Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 721 (Ala. 1982). 
11. E.g., Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 243, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1982); P. v. 
Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 470-71, 432 A.2d 556,558 (1981); Rieck v. Medical 
Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 518-19, 219 N.W.2d 242, 245 (1974); see also Recent 
Decisions, Malpractice/Wrongful Birth/Damages, ILL. B.J., March 1984, at 374. 
12. Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514,518,219 N.W.2d 242, 245 (1974). 
13. Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 243, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1982). 
14. Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 722 (Ala. 1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 
239, 241, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (1982). 
15. Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718,722 (Ala. 1982). 
16. Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 722 (Ala. 1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 
239,241,628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 
556 (1981) (concern for child's welfare illustrated by court's refusal to use surname 
in opinion); see also Recent Decisions, One More Mouth to Feed: A Look at Physi-
cians' Liability for the Negligent Performance of Sterilization Operations, 25 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 1069, 1073-74 (1983); Case Note, Wilbur v. Kerr: The Tort of Wrongful 
Birth in Arkansas, 36 ARK. L. REV. 413, 443-45 (1982). 
17. E.g., Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 243, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (1982); Cockrum v. 
Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193,201,447 N.E.2d 385,389, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 149 
(1983); Weintraub v. Brown, 98 A.D.2d 339, 470 N.Y.S.2d 634, 641 (1983); 
Shaheen v. Knight, 6 Lyc. 19, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 45 (1957); Case Note, supra 
note 16, at 440-41; Recent Decisions, supra note 11, at 377; see also Robertson, supra 
note 7, at 3 (Canadian case described claim as "grotesque"). 
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of a healthy new life. ls Similarly, some jurisdictions have evaluated the 
benefits of the child's birth and determined a damages award to be im-
proper, holding that the benefits derived from the child's birth outweigh 
the financial burdens of raising the child. 19 The words of one judge ex-
emplify this policy argument: "In a proper hierarchy of values, the bene-
fit of life should not be outweighed by the expense of supporting it."20 
One court indicated that the parents' failure to decide to have an abor-
tion or to give the child up for adoption demonstrated that the benefits 
derived from the child outweighed any hardships.21 
The minority view jurisdictions have rejected the assertions of the 
majority and have permitted the recovery of damages for prospective 
child rearing expenses.22 Within the minority, California courts permit 
full recovery of all costs of raising the child.23 Other minority jurisdic-
tions apply the "benefits rule"24 in the computation of recoverable dam-
ages.25 Under the "benefits rule," the costs associated with raising the 
child are reduced by the value of the benefits the child confers upon the 
plaintiff-parents.26 In evaluating the value of the benefit, all the circum-
stances surrounding the child's birth are considered.27 Critics of the 
"benefits rule" argue that the benefits to the parents resulting from the 
child's birth, which are non-pecuniary, may not be properly offset against 
18. Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 243, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1982). 
19. Several days after Jones was decided, the Iowa supreme court stated, "a parent can-
not be said to have been damaged or injured by the birth and rearing of a normal, 
healthy child because the invaluable benefits of parenthood outweigh the mere mon-
etary burdens as a matter of law." Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520, 522-23 
(1984); accord Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), 
affd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1085 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). 
20. Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 201,447 N.E.2d 385,389, cert. denied, 104 
S. Ct. 149 (1983). 
21. Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), affd, 349 A.2d 8 
(Del. 1975). 
22. Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 265, 473 A.2d 429, 433 (1984); see Annot., 83 
A.L.R.3D 15 (1978). 
23. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 325-26, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (1967). 
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977) contains the definition of the ben-
efits rule: 
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or 
to his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the inter-
est of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is 
considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable. 
25. E.g., University of Ariz. v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 584, 667 P.2d 1294, 1299 
(1983); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 260-61,445 A.2d 883, 886 (1982); Sherlock 
v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977); see a/so, Recent Decisions, 
supra note 16, at 1070. 
26. Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 260-61, 445 A.2d 883, 886 (1982); Sherlock v. 
Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977). 
27. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 519 (1971) (family size, family 
income, age of parents, and marital status are some but not all of the factors to be 
considered in determining the extent to which the birth of a child represents a bene-
fit to the parents). 
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the pecuniary interests impaired.28 Nevertheless, some courts have rea-
soned that a broad reading of the benefits rule permits the non-pecuniary 
benefits to mitigate damages awarded for all of the interests impaired, 
regardless of whether such interests are of a pecuniary or of a non-pecu-
niary nature. 29 
The minority's decisions reject the majority's contention that the 
damages are too speculative. As one judge stated, "juries in tort cases 
are often required to assess just such intangible factors, both emotional 
and pecuniary, and we see no reason why a new rule should be adopted 
for wrongful pregnancy cases."30 Furthermore, more than one court has 
recognized that, contrary to the majority view, the benefits of the birth of 
an unplanned child may not always override the associated financial 
responsibility.31 
The courts advocating recovery of damages for prospective child 
rearing expenses assert that a wrongful conception action is comparable 
to any other tort action.32 Accordingly, the measure of damages recov-
ered should correspond to all the injuries proximately caused by the 
tortfeasor's act.33 
Before Jones v. Malinowski,34 no Maryland court had determined 
what damages are recoverable in a suit for negligent performance of a 
sterilization procedure.35 In Sard v. Hardy,36 however, the court of ap-
28. Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Iowa 1984) ("awkwardness" of applying 
benefits rule); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 243, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1982) 
(recognizing a benefit may not be calculated from the total failure of medical service 
giving rise to the action); Comment, supra note 5, at 1182; Note, Judicial Limita-
tions on Damages Recoverable for the Wrongful Birth of a Healthy Infant, 68 VA. L. 
REV. 1311, 1324 (1982) ("same interest" rule in applying § 920 of the Restatement 
does not apply to recovery of child rearing costs because different interests are 
involved). 
29. E.g., University of Ariz. v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 584-85, 667 P.2d 1294, 
1299 (1983); Dchs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 259-60, 445 A.2d 883, 886 (1982); 
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977). But cf Boone v. 
Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 721 (Ala. 1982) (court rejected benefits rule but al-
lowed claims for mother's pain and suffering and father's loss of consortium); Wil-
bur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239,244,628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (1982) (public policy prohibits 
use of benefits rule; however, expenses of the sterilization and pregnancy were per-
mitted); Case Note, supra note 16, at 448-50 (partial recovery of damages notwith-
standing the benefits the child bestows upon the parents). 
30. University of Ariz. v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 582, 667 P.2d 1294, 1297-98 
(1983). 
31. E.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1552-55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. 
Ct. 425 (1983); Dchs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 259, 445 A.2d 883, 885-86 (1982); 
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 51l, 517 (1971). 
32. E.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1552-55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. 
Ct. 425 (1983); University of Ariz. v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 585-86, 667 
P.2d 1294, 1301 (1983); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn. 
1977). 
33. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (1967); Sorkin 
v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300, 303 (1980) (Hancock, J., dissenting). 
34. 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984). 
35. Id. at 259, 473 A.2d at 430. 
36. 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977). 
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peals decided that injuries resulting from a physician's negligence in per-
forming a sterilization operation are actionable. Sard involved informed 
consent to a sterilization operation,37 and the court did not consider 
whether child rearing costs are available as damages.38 
The court of appeals in Jones rejected the absolute bar against recov-
ery of child rearing expenses followed in the majority of jurisdictions as 
contrary to traditional principles followed in Maryland for the award of 
damages in negligence cases. 39 Recognizing that established standards 
for recovery permit an award of damages for injuries that are "affirma-
tively proved with reasonable certainty to have resulted in the natural, 
proximate and direct effect of the tortious misconduct,"40 the court rea-
soned that negligently performed sterilization procedures should not be 
excepted from these standards.41 Commentators42 and other courts43 
have noted the importance of applying the same negligence damages 
standards applied in other tort actions. 
The Jones court refuted44 the physician's assertions45 that the specu-
37. Id. at 434, 379 A.2d at 1017. 
38. Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977); Brief for Appellant at 13, Jones 
v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984). 
39. Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 269-70, 473 A.2d 429, 435 (1984); see supra 
notes 6-22 and accompanying text. 
40. Jones, 299 Md. at 269,473 A.2d at 435 (citing Empire Realty Co. v. Fleisher, 269 
Md. 278, 305 A.2d 144 (1973); McAlister v. Carl, 233 Md. 446, 197 A.2d 140 
(1964); Plank v. Summers, 205 Md. 598, 109 A.2d 914 (1954». In computing re-
coverable damages, Maryland recognizes the duty to mitigate damages and applies 
the benefits rule. Jones, 299 Md. at 269, 473 A.2d at 435 (citing Rogers v. Frush, 
257 Md. 233, 262 A.2d 549 (1970); Hendler Creamery Co. v. Miller, 153 Md. 264, 
138 A. 1 (1927); Groh v. South, 119 Md. 297, 86 A. 1036 (1913) (benefits rule 
recognized». 
41. Jones, 299 Md. at 269-70, 473 A.2d at 435. 
42. E.g., Recent Decisions, supra note 16, at 1079 (application of tort principles pro-
vides adequate compensation to injured plaintiffs, deters negligent medical practices 
and avoids unjust enrichment); Comment, supra note 5 (advocating analysis utiliz-
ing negligence standards); Note, supra note 28, at 1331 (same principles used in 
other tort actions necessary to provide proper compensation). 
43. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (1967) (physi-
cian liable for all detriment proximately caused); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 
258, 445 A.2d 883, 885 (1982) (exception to tort liability would impair parents' 
constitutionally protected right to practice family planning); Nanke v. Napier, 346 
N.W.2d 520, 523-24 (Iowa 1984) (Wolle, J., dissenting) (traditional principles of 
tort law are adequate to arrive at fair decision on damages; rejected prohibiting 
damages as a matter oflaw); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 
517 (1971) (denial of recovery would leave void in medical malpractice); Sherlock v. 
Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 174-75 (Minn. 1977) (physician should be held 
responsible for the consequences that have in fact resulted from the physician's ac-
tions; imposition of liability will serve as a deterrent to negligently performed sterili-
zation); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180,434 N.Y.S.2d 300, 303 (1980) (Hancock, J., 
dissenting) (majority departs from the accepted rule of damages in malpractice 
actions). 
44. Jones, 299 Md. at 272-73, 473 A.2d at 436-37. 
45. Brief for Appellant at 26-31, Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 
(1984). 
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lative and unquantifiable nature of the damages precluded their recovery 
without express legislative authority. The physician analogized the dam-
ages claim for child rearing costs to the solatium damages in a wrongful 
death action:46 because Maryland courts refused to award solatium dam-
ages pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act47 until such an award was 
specifically authorized in a statute, the physician claimed that the same 
statutory authority is a prerequisite to the damages award for child rear-
ing costS.48 In response to this argument, the court stated that costs to 
maintain, support, and educate a child are quantifiable and reasonably 
foreseeable. 49 The necessary calculations are similar to the computations 
required in a domestic support proceeding and by the routine forecasts of 
an actuary. 50 Furthermore, the average citizen is aware of the expenses 
incurred in raising a family.51 Finally, the court refuted the contention 
that legislative action is a prerequisite to the requested damages. 52 
The court required that, as in other negligence actions, the jury's 
analysis of damages properly includes an application of the "benefits 
rule."53 While the court did not specifically discuss the criticisms di-
rected at utilizing the "benefits rule"54 in computing recoverable child 
rearing costs, it prescribed an analysis that eases the claimed improprie-
ties. The court made the interest that the parents wished to protect by 
undergoing the sterilization operation an integral part of the damages 
calculation. 55 
46. [d.; see also Jones, 299 Md. at 262, 473 A.2d at 431. 
47. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-901 to -904 (1984); Wittel v. Baker, 10 
Md. App. 531, 536-37,272 A.2d 57, 59 (1971) (refusal to allow solatium damages 
where death occurred prior to the effective date of the Wrongful Death Act). Sola-
tium damages are "[d]amages allowed for injury to the feelings," in contrast to pe-
cuniary damages. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1248 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). 
48. Brief for Appellant at 26-31, Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 
(1984); Jones, 299 Md. at 262,473 A.2d at 431. 
49. Jones, 299 Md. at 272,473 A.2d at 436. An economist demographer had calculated 
and testified as to the costs to raise the child to the age of majority. [d. at 261, 473 
A.2d at 431. 
50. [d. at 272, 473 A.2d at 436; accord Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 727 (Ala. 
1982) (Faulkner, J., concurring specially) (rejecting speculative nature of damages 
and finding them similar to other tort actions); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445 
A.2d 883, 886 (1982) (assessment of damages similar to loss of consortium case). 
51. Jones, 299 Md. at 272, 473 A.2d at 436. 
52. The court stated: 
That these items of damage were not originally recoverable in wrongful 
death actions, but were only made so by statute, does not mean that simi-
lar items, calculated as offsetting benefits in determining the ultimate 
award of consequential damages, are not, absent a statute, appropriately 
measurable and recoverable in a common law malpractice action based on 
negligence. 
[d. at 272-73, 473 A.2d at 437. 
53. [d. at 269, 473 A.2d at 435 (acknowledging recognition of benefits rule in Mary-
land). For a definition of the "benefits rule," see supra note 24. 
54. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
55. Jones, 299 Md. at 270-71, 473 A.2d at 435-36 (adopting motivational analysis); see 
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With regard to the principle of mitigating damages, S6 the Jones 
court rejected the physician's assertion that mitigation in the present case 
required undergoing an abortion or placing the child for adoption. S7 Sim-
ilar to the holdings of numerous jurisdictions, S8 the court held adoption 
and abortion to be unreasonable measures of mitigation. S9 
In Jones v. Malinowski,60 the court adopted the best approach to 
computing the damages recoverable for a negligent sterilization proce-
dure. The rule protects the interests of the injured parents while not sub-
jecting the negligent physician to damages beyond those recognized 
under traditional negligence standards. 
The court in Jones 61 advocated that the trier of fact examine all the 
circumstances surrounding the sterilization procedure,62 placing empha-
sis on an inquiry into the parents' motivation for undergoing the-
sterilization procedure (that is, whether their reasons were genetic, 
therapeutic, or economic).63 This motivational analysis suggests that as a 
prerequisite to recovery, the interest harmed by the negligent conduct 
must correspond to the interest the sterilization was to protect.64 This 
generally infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text (explaining this damages 
calculation). 
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (1977) states, in pertinent part: "One 
injured by the tort of another is not entitled to recover damages for any harm that 
he could have avoided by the use of reasonable effort or expenditure after the com-
mission of the tort." 
57. Jones, 299 Md. at 274, 473 A.2d at 437-38. 
58. E.g., University of Ariz. v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 586 n.5, 667 P.2d 1294, 
1301 n.5 (1983); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 203-04, 447 N.E. 385, 
390-91, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 149 (1983); Clapham V. Yanga, 102 Mich. App. 47, 
57-58, 300 N.W.2d 727, 732-33 (1981) (damages awarded to child's grandparents 
where court determined adoption of child by a third party would be against the 
child's best interest); see also 3 M. MINZER, J. NATES, C. KIMBALL, D. ALEXROD 
& R. GOLDSTEIN, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 18.14(1)(a) (1982) (mitigation 
through abortion or adoption is unreasonable; it is in the best interest of the child to 
have the child raised by his natural parents). 
59. Jones, 299 Md. at 273, 473 A.2d at 437-38. 
60. 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984). 
61. ld. 
62. Id. at 272, 473 A.2d at 436-37. This approach is similar to the standard applied in 
Troppi V. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 257,187 N.W.2d 511,519 (1971) (family size, 
family income, age of parents, and marital status are some but not all of the factors 
to be considered in determining the extent to which the birth of a child represents a 
benefit to the parents). 
63. Jones, 299 Md. at 272, 473 A.2d at 437. See generally Hartke V. McKelway, 707 
F.2d 1544, 1552-55 (D.C. Cir.) (importance ofa couple's reasons for choosing not to 
have children in determining damages), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 425 (1983); Chris-
tensen V. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934) (courts look at purpose of 
sterilization); Comment, supra note 5 (explanation of relevance of why a steriliza-
tion was pursued). 
64. Jones, 299 Md. at 272, 473 A.2d at 436. See Hartke V. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 
1551-55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 425 (1983); Comment, supra note 5, at 
1189-90; Recent Decisions, supra note 16, at 1076. For example, a jury may find 
that parents who pursue sterilization solely to prevent the birth of a child that 
would suffer from a genetic disease are not injured by the birth of a healthy child. 
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analysis protects the physician from onerous liability, because recovery 
of child rearing costs is limited to instances when the ineffective steriliza-
tion actually damaged the parents. Yet, at the same time, parents are not 
denied recovery for impairment of interests they had actually sought to 
protect. In contrast, states that prohibit recovery of child rearing ex-
penses shield physicians from liability and bar parents from a remedy 
that would be available in other malpractice actions.6s 
Physicians are liable for the child rearing costs only if they are 
found guilty of negligence and if the fact finder determines that an eco-
nomic interest of the parents was injured.66 Hence, liability is not pres-
ent every time a child is born subsequent to a sterilization operation on 
one of the parents. Contrary to criticisms,67 the physician's liability is 
indistinguishable from that of a tortfeasor in other tort actions. 68 
Courts69 and commentators70 have acknowledged the importance of 
according parents in a negligent sterilization procedure action the same 
standards of recovery that are applied in other malpractice actions. 
Costs of rearing a child are determinable, and a jury is competent to 
weigh the claimed damages and any benefits resulting from the negligent 
act.7 1 The Jones court, however, did not consider the potential inequity 
of a windfall to the parents that may arise after the award of damages. 72 
The imposition of a constructive trust on the damages award is a possible 
solution to the problem. 
The position of the court of appeals is, as expressed in its own 
words, an "attempt to do justice in an imperfect world."73 The opinion 
limits the recovery of child rearing costs to instances when the parents 
are actually injured by the ineffective sterilization. It also does not shield 
physicians from liability by cloaking negligent sterilization procedures 
with judicial protections distinct from other malpractice actions. 
65. Note, supra note 28, at 1320. 
66. Jones, 299 Md. at 272, 473 A.2d at 436. 
67. Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 517-18, 219 N.W.2d 242, 244 
(1974) (award of damages to parents would allow parents all the emotional benefits 
of childrearing while placing the entire financial burden of the child upon the doc-
tor); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982) (award of childrearing 
expenses would open the way for fraudulent claims). 
68. Dchs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 258, 445 A.2d 883, 885 (1982); Sherlock v. Stillwa-
ter Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn. 1977). See Recent Development, Medical 
Malpractice, 6 AMER. J. TRIAL ADV. 511 (1983) (discussion of cases deciding when 
the statutory period for negligently performed sterilization procedure commences). 
69. See supra note 43. 
70. Robertson, supra note 7, at 4 (English commentator recognizes importance of al-
lowing recovery of full damages in order to reach equitable solution); Recent Deci-
sions, supra note 5, at 189 (criticizing denial of recovery); Recent Decisions, supra 
note 16, at 1079; Recent Decisions, supra note 11, at 378 (conceding that denial of 
damage claims creates "an umbrella of invulnerability for doctors and hospitals neg-
ligent in performing or testing the effectiveness of sterilization operations"). 
71. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
72. A windfall would result, for example, if the parents were awarded damages for the 
costs of rearing the child and the child died before attaining the age of majority. 
73. Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 275, 473 A.2d 429, 438 (1984). 
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The decision has an immediate effect upon the potential liability of 
physicians performing sterilization operations. While the standard of 
care remains unchanged, the potential liability in the event of negligence 
has increased. The Jones decision does not examine how its principles 
might be applied to the situation in which a defective child's birth is 
caused by a physician's negligence. In such a case, however, the court 
would be likely to evaluate the parents' claims under the same principles. 
In comparison, the defective child's claim would not be evaluated under 
the principles set forth in Jones. 74 
Lisa Stello 
74. See generally supra note 5 (discussing the difference between the child's action and 
the parents' action); see also Comment, supra note 5; Recent Decisions, supra note 
5. 
